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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






YUDITH ANTONIETA FLORES-RIOS, 




 ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA                            
_____________ 
 
On Petition for Review from the  
Board of Immigration Appeals 
BIA No. A206-247-155 
Immigration Judge: Ramin Rastegar  
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
on January 19, 2021 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 






SMITH, Chief Judge.   
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 





 Yudith Flores-Rios petitions for review of a May 27, 2020 Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision adopting and affirming the Immigration 
Judge’s (IJ) denial of her application for withholding of removal and protection 
under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).  For the reasons that follow, we will 
deny the petition for review. 
I. 
 Flores-Rios, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without a 
valid entry document in October 2013 and was served with a notice to appear 
shortly thereafter.  She applied for withholding of removal and CAT protection,1 
claiming she was afraid to return to El Salvador because her ex-boyfriend was 
abusive, and because, when she briefly went into business with her sister selling 
tortillas from their home, a gang known as the Mara left her a note demanding $35 
as “rent” and threatening her if she did not pay. 
The IJ issued a detailed opinion denying relief.  Flores-Rios appealed to the 
BIA, which affirmed and adopted the IJ’s decision.  This timely petition for review 
followed.2 
 
1 Flores-Rios also applied for asylum but did not seek review of the IJ’s 
determination that she was statutorily ineligible because she applied outside the 
one-year deadline. 
2 We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a).  Because the BIA adopted the IJ’s decision and discussed some of the 
bases for the IJ’s decision, we review both decisions.  See He Chun Chen v. 





In support of her application for withholding of removal, Flores-Rios argued 
that, if she returns to El Salvador, she more likely than not will be persecuted on 
account of her membership in a particular social group (PSG).  See Lukwago v. 
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 180 (3d Cir. 2003); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b).  She claimed to 
be a member of two PSGs: (1) Salvadoran “abused women who do not have any 
protection by the government authority against the domestic violence,” and 
(2) “business owners targeted by gangs.”  Pet’r Br. 7.  The existence of a PSG is a 
question of law we consider de novo, while we review the agency’s underlying 
factual findings for substantial evidence.  S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 543 
(3d Cir. 2018).   
As to the first PSG, the IJ concluded that, even if it is cognizable, Flores-
Rios failed to establish her membership in that group because she “did not 
establish that she . . . was unable[] to leave [her ex-boyfriend].”  JA 70.  Rather, 
when she departed El Salvador in 2013, the ex-boyfriend “simply let [her] leave”; 
she has not seen him for several years since and they have both moved on to new 
relationships.  Id. 
Flores-Rios responds that she testified to persecution suffered at her ex-
boyfriend’s hands, including a threat with a machete.  But that is not sufficient.  




point to any evidence to undermine the independent finding that she failed to show 
that she was unable to leave the abusive relationship.  Flores-Rios bore the burden 
to establish her membership in her own proposed PSG.  See S.E.R.L., 894 F.3d at 
555.  The IJ’s determination that she failed to do so is supported by reasonable, 
substantial, and probative evidence of record.  See id. at 543.  We therefore will not 
disturb that finding.   
Next, the IJ concluded that Flores-Rios’s second PSG is not cognizable 
because it is defined by the harm suffered and because business ownership is not 
an immutable characteristic.  Flores-Rios disagrees, contending that the experience 
of being a business owner who received a threat from a gang is an immutable 
characteristic.  She also argues that she “should not be required to change her 
status as a business owner in order to avoid being persecuted.”  Pet’r Br. 16. 
Once again, Flores-Rios fails to adequately respond to the IJ’s analysis.  
Even if we were to accept her contention that her experience of being a business 
owner is an immutable characteristic or a characteristic that she should not be 
required to change—a doubtful proposition, given that she was a business owner 
for only about six months and apparently has no plans to revisit that career 
choice—she did not persuasively refute the IJ’s independent determination that the 
proposed PSG fails because its definition is circular: it is defined by the harm 




exists independently of the harm she claims to have suffered.  See Lukwago, 329 
F.3d at 172 (“[U]nder the statute a ‘particular social group’ must exist 
independently of the persecution suffered by the applicant for asylum . . . .  [T]he 
‘particular social group’ must have existed before the persecution began.”).  
Accordingly, the second PSG is not cognizable.3    
III. 
To prevail on her CAT claim, Flores-Rios had to show that she more likely 
than not would suffer harm amounting to torture if she were to return to El 
Salvador.  See Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.16(c)(2).  She contends that she presented the IJ with sufficient evidence of 
past torture but the IJ “failed to make an independent determination concerning her 
request for CAT relief.”  Pet’r Br. 20–21.   
Contrary to her arguments, the IJ expressly determined that Flores-Rios 
failed to show mistreatment by her ex-boyfriend or the Mara rising to the legal 
definition of torture, that Flores-Rios’s sister continues to live in the same town 
 
3 Flores-Rios also contends that she “presented credible and sufficient testimony as 
to the past persecution she suffered at the hands of the Mara[] gang and her ex-
boyfriend.”  Pet’r Br. 14.  But although the IJ observed that some allegations were 
inadequately corroborated, the IJ ultimately did not deny Flores-Rios’s claims 
based on a lack of credibility.  Given that she did not establish membership in the 
first PSG and that the second PSG is not cognizable, her credibility does not 





without being persecuted, and that Flores-Rios presented no evidence that her ex-
boyfriend or the Mara would target her if she were to return to El Salvador.  The IJ 
thus made an independent determination and concluded that Flores-Rios’s 
evidence did not meet her burden of proof for CAT protection.  Because she points 
to no evidence compelling a contrary conclusion, we will reject her claim.   
IV. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
